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Abstract
This exploratory study leverages a major dataset of official penalties against Brazilian bureaucrats enforced between
January 2003 and November 2014, when 5,005 expulsive sanctions were enforced, 68.5% of which concerned acts of
corruption. The analysis and discussion also integrate qualitative data gathered through 24 semi-structured interviews
with civil servants who were integrity enforcers. Despite the rapid increase in the number of penalties enforced over the
years, the creation of a robust set of disciplinary norms and an anti-corruption agency have not secured a fully opera-
tional horizontal accountability system within the executive. A great variance of corruption control was observed across
agencies, manifested through disproportionate enforcement, not only of overall sanctions but also of corruption and non-
corruption-related penalties. In light of the self-protective behaviour of civil servants, who openly say they do not feel
comfortable in the role of corruption fighters, the article advances an argument on ‘convenient accountability’—a kind
of institutional abdication combined with a reluctance for peer monitoring, with outcomes that can be described as satis-
ficing for integrity agents. This institutional aspect poses a risk to internal disciplinary systems and increases dependence
upon external actors of accountability, compromising the efficiency of both.
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1. Introduction
Understanding bureaucratic corruption is a challenge for
researchers from different fields. Although one of the
most straightforward approaches used to combat corrup-
tion comprises penalising illicit behaviour and rewarding
integrity, there is still a significant need to better assess
initiatives based on harsher sentences and greater incen-
tives in the civil service (Gans-Morse et al., 2018, p. 174).
The same applies to the analysis of the efficacy of anti-
corruption agencies and how they coordinate efforts to
achieve competent oversight and punishment of poten-
tial wrongdoing within each governmental body.
Not only are studies on bureaucratic corruption con-
trol scarce, but those that do exist do not offer an op-
timistic outlook. They stress the risk of disciplinary con-
trol exacerbating bureaucratic pathologies (Anechiarico
& Jacobs, 1996), and highlight that dismissal procedures
can have detrimental effects by leading to more corrup-
tion (Fjeldstad, 2003) and undermining of staff morale
(Davis, 2004). Severe penalties are also likely to have
little effect when monitoring capacity is poor (Alt &
Lassen, 2014). With regard to rewards, existing empiri-
cal evidence suggests that adequate salaries are a nec-
essary but insufficient condition for curbing corruption
(Gans-Morse et al., 2018, p. 173).
It has been argued that enforcing policies to improve
the motivation of public-sector workers could prove
more efficient in fighting bureaucratic corruption than
top-down monitoring or the enforcement of harsh sanc-
tions (Gans-Morse et al., 2018). However, the idea that
bureaucrats are guided primarily by professional norms
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and a sense of obligation to society (Perry, 1996; Perry
& Hondeghem, 2008), setting aside their own individ-
ual interests, defies the models that show public officials
to be self-interested individuals (Brennan & Buchanan,
1985; March & Olsen, 1989) who attempt to maximise
career success (Geddes, 1994) when choosing policies
and making decisions. Thinking about the costs and ben-
efits as perceived by those responsible for enforcing
the anti-corruption apparatus helps to clarify the fac-
tors that could compromise the effectiveness of more
rules, procedures and organisational changes in the fight
against corruption.
With the broad aim of apprehending the perceived
incentives for and constraints upon anti-corruption mea-
sures within the civil service, this article examines the
official response to bureaucratic corruption, focusing on
the issue of peer monitoring. The narrower goal is to
identify trends so that future research can use this in-
formation to better understand bureaucratic corruption
and the likely effectiveness of initiatives aimed at control-
ling it. This study is, therefore, an exploratory attempt
to uncover the dynamics behind administrative penalties
for corruption by examining descriptive statistics for the
sanctions enforced and through interviews with 24 in-
tegrity enforcers. It uses the Brazilian federal executive
and the work of its anti-corruption agency, the Office of
the Comptroller General (Controladoria Geral da União),
as a case study of disciplinary action.
Although this study advocates that corruption is “the
abuse of a trust, generally one involving public power,
for private benefits which often, but by nomeans always,
come in the form of money” (Johnston, 2005, p. 11),
for methodological reasons the analysis of the data pre-
sented in this thesis restricts itself to the Office of the
Comptroller General’s typology of corruption, which is
limited to administrative legal types (see Supplementary
File). The theoretical framework presented in the next
section draws on principal-agent theory to explore the
phenomenon of collusion as an attempt to understand
which factors, other than the actual wrongdoing that in-
tegrity enforcers are tasked with investigating, are taken
into consideration by those enforcers when holding their
peers accountable. The rationale here is that governmen-
tal bodies responsible for imposing ethical behaviour and
disciplinary control may sometimes be selective in terms
of actions and targets, due to the external and inter-
nal demands and interests to which these bodies and
their integrity enforcers are exposed (Vasconcellos de
Figueiredo, 2016).
Accountability is very likely to be enforced in a way
that reduces costs, difficulty and inconvenience for the
integrity enforcers themselves. The result is less-than-
complete accountability, which this study refers to as
a manifestation of ‘convenient accountability.’ It is as-
sumed that manifestations of convenient accountability
are more likely to be found when government branches
are supposed to hold themselves accountable, and es-
pecially when offenders and enforcers are colleagues,
as is the case in the Brazilian executive branch. This
study also expects that corruption-related procedures
are more likely to involve convenient accountability, as
they may be perceived as more complex and costlier to
investigate when compared, for example, to abandon-
ment of office or frequent absence, which also result in
the expulsion of civil servants in Brazil.
The article then presents the data and methods.
Following that, the evolution of the Brazilian account-
ability mechanisms and how disciplinary and criminal
sanctions interact in the Brazilian context are discussed.
Based on what has already been observed in the public
service in Latin America (Geddes, 1994; Gingerich, 2013;
Grindle, 2012), this study expected to find fragile and
incomplete institutionalisation of the recent reforms to
the Brazilian disciplinary system, particularly thosemade
since the Office of the Comptroller General was created
in the early 2000s to coordinate anti-corruption efforts
in the federal executive.
The findings revealed a large cross-agency diversity in
the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms, mani-
fested through disproportionate enforcement, not only
of overall sanctions but also of corruption- and non-
corruption-related penalties. The interviews suggested
that even when formal rules and internal affairs units
have been established, oversight and punishment are
more likely to be enforced if outcomes are convenient
for integrity enforcers themselves. This aspect of institu-
tional design poses a clear risk to internal disciplinary sys-
tems and increases dependence upon external actors of
horizontal accountability, compromising the efficiency of
both. Although this article contributes to the debate on
bureaucratic corruption by exploring constraints on peer
monitoring and their possible impact on the issuing of
official penalties, it concludes by suggesting further re-
search with more robust models and empirical evidence
to ensure more credible and consistent anti-corruption
monitoring and enforcement.
2. Theoretical Foundations
Previous studies on corruption and bureaucracy empha-
sise that the quality of public administration, especially
professionalisation and autonomy—the independence
of bureaucrats from political principals—is an important
determinant of corruption (Bersch, Praça, & Taylor, 2016;
Loureiro, Abrucio, & Pacheco, 2012; Meyer-Sahling &
Mikkelsen, 2016; Oliveros & Schuster, 2017; Treisman,
2000). These studies point out, in particular, the positive
impact of recruitment on merit in terms of reducing cor-
ruption (Dahlström, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012; Rauch &
Evans, 2000). But unfortunately they have not shed light
on control and the implementation of disciplinary sanc-
tions as deterrents for corruption.
Although it is assumed that the degree of deter-
rence can decrease sharply if law enforcement is flawed
(Becker & Stigler, 1974), very little is said about the
willingness of and incentives for integrity enforcers
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to enforce policies or, as addressed in this study, to
monitor, conduct investigations, and suggest sanctions
against their own peers, as in Brazil. Agency theory
has emphasised the benefits of peer monitoring, sug-
gesting it can increase performance and the chances
of detecting misconduct and inappropriate behaviour
(Laffont & Meleu, 1997; Loughry & Tosi, 2008; Stiglitz,
1990). Self-policing would solve problems related to
self-interested behaviour and asymmetric information.
Loughry and Tosi (2008, p. 877) point out that, under
agency theory, agents are assumed to be both effort-
and risk-averse, and may be opportunistic in the pursuit
of their self-interest. Agents also often have better in-
formation than principals, which allows them to conceal
their actions. From the classical principal-agent perspec-
tive, rulers are the principals and bureaucrats the agents
(Rose-Ackerman, 1978; van Rijckeghem &Weder, 2001).
Peer monitors, however, can potentially face issues
related to self-interested behaviour. The concern that bu-
reaucrats might identify with interest groups rather than
serve the public interest (Geddes, 1994; Tirole, 1993)
should also be extended to integrity enforcers. The phe-
nomenon of collusion, in which behaviour is better pre-
dicted by the analysis of group as well as individual incen-
tives (Laffont & Rochet, 1997; Tirole, 1993), is a theoret-
ical framework that has been expanding fast within the
field of organisation studies. Collusion theory provides
a set of insights to understand how civil servants hold
themselves accountable.
Lessons from Latin America, in particular, suggest
that civil service reforms aimed at building up amore pro-
fessional and responsible corps involve years and some-
times decades of conflict, mainly with supporters of pa-
tronage, and are by no means assured of success by the
passing of a law or the creation of a new institution
(Grindle, 2012, p. 11). While discussing the struggle over
reforms that were intended to increase state capacity,
Geddes states that “levels of competence, efficiency and
honesty have varied widely within the Brazilian democ-
racy” (Geddes, 1994, p. 20). In such settings, not only
the politicisation of bureaucracy but also electoral rules
have important consequences for the efficacy of corrup-
tion networks (Gingerich, 2013, p. 48).
Although this article does not focus on the significant
overlap between political and bureaucratic careers in
Brazil, as Gingerich (2013) competently does, it explores
latent variables related to corruption control, evaluated
by the author through survey data from interviews with
civil servants in Brazil, Chile and Bolivia. In a slightly differ-
ent vein fromGingerich’swork, this exploratory study also
considers internal controls, the likelihood of being inves-
tigated and the likelihood of dismissal when analysing the
distribution of administrative penalties, and investigates
the perceived costs and benefits of peer monitoring.
The aforementioned theories make it possible to ar-
gue that the legal settings and disciplinary control mech-
anisms often ignore the probability of increasing the
cost of control and promote collusion or a high level of
reliance on external accountability enforcers. It cannot
be assumed that integrity enforcers are always compe-
tent andmotivated to enforce accountability, even when
the institutional apparatus is updated and checks-and-
balances mechanisms exist on paper. In public organisa-
tions, holding civil servants and politicians accountable
involves effort, difficulties, and many inconveniences.
It can be expected, therefore, that state agencies re-
sponsible for imposing ethical behaviour and disciplinary
control may sometimes be selective in terms of actions
and targets, due to the external and internal demands
and interests to which they are exposed (Vasconcellos de
Figueiredo, 2016). This article aims to explore whether
there is a variation of sanctions for corruption and other
serious administrative offences and, if so, to look for ev-
idence to support the theory that this is due to the per-
ceived high costs of oversight and punishment mecha-
nisms from the enforcers’ point of view.
As Samuel P. Huntington stated when talking about
democracy, a “value which is normally good in itself is
not necessarily optimised when it is maximised” (1989,
p. 33). This is also the case of accountability from the
perspective of integrity enforcers. Because of a series of
considerations other than thewrongdoing of those inves-
tigated, accountability is only enforced to certain extents,
or in a form that reduces perceived costs and avoids un-
comfortable conflicts for integrity enforcers. The concept
of ‘convenient accountability’ is defined as constraints
on accountability as a result of the tendency on the part
of thosewho are supposed to uphold integrity and/or de-
ter misconduct (‘integrity enforcers’) to choose actions
and/or targets that are convenient for them. The result is
partial enforcement, i.e. neither total impunity nor com-
plete accountability.
‘Accountability’ is defined here as a system of inter-
nal and external checks and balances aimed at ensuring
that duties are properly carried out and individuals held
responsible if they fail to do so (Bovens, 2007; Fox, 2007;
Macaulay, 2002; O’Donnell, 1999). ‘Integrity agents’ re-
fer to those entitled to design, monitor and enforce nor-
mative and other safeguards to uphold integrity and/or
deter misconduct by monitoring, investigating and pun-
ishing. In addition, the concept of convenient account-
ability builds on several existing definitions of account-
ability, in which state agencies oversee and sanction
public officials (Fox, 2007; Mainwaring & Welna, 2003;
O’Donnell, 1999; Vasconcellos de Figueiredo, 2016)
while aiming to focus attention on the mechanisms of
control and punishment and to emphasise how the en-
forcement of accountability can be subjective and lim-
ited in practical terms.
This study expects to find stronger manifestations of
convenient accountability in regard to corruption-related
procedures as it may be more time-consuming and diffi-
cult to collect material evidence in such cases compared
to other serious offences. Administrative sanctions for
corruption-related cases necessarily result in dismissals
or cancellations of pension and criminal procedures may
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be initiated against the bureaucrat under suspicion. In ad-
dition, the constraints on accountability are more likely
to be found in agencies with less mature and less organ-
ised internal affairs departments and fewer dedicated
personnel, and which depend to a great extent on other
civil servants to carry out disciplinary procedures. This
increases the proximity between the investigators and
those being investigated, and consequently produces
more constraints.
3. Data and Methods
This study can be seen as exploratory due to the scarcity
of other research that has used disciplinary sanctions
against civil servants as the main object of analysis when
assessing bureaucratic corruption control. In Brazil, the
list of all the dismissals, demotions, and cancellations of
pension that were enforced as punishments—along with
the full name of the civil servant, the agency and state
where they were working, and the date when the pun-
ishment was published in the federal government offi-
cial gazette—is available to the public on the federal gov-
ernment transparency website (Portal da Transparência
Brasil, 2020).
In response to my formal request by email in 2014,
the Office of the Comptroller General provided the same
list available online with additional information on those
punished, such as the social security number, the title of
the position the individual held, the procedure number,
and the laws and norms that were violated, which indi-
cate whether the act can be categorised as corruption.
The time period covered was January 2003 to November
2014. From the Personnel Statistics Bulletin, a report re-
leased monthly and openly accessible on the Ministry of
Planning website, it was possible to gather information
on the general figures regarding the federal civil service,
such as the size of workforce and annual expenditure
on salaries.
Unfortunately, no data were available for those cases
in which civil servants were acquitted after being inves-
tigated or had their case closed without any sanction
being enforced for any other reason. The quantitative
dataset is thus limited to enforced cases (civil servants
whowere caught and punished) and it only encompasses
civil servantsworking directly for the central government
inministries, governmental bodies, foundations, and reg-
ulatory agencieswhowere sanctioned for engaging in bu-
reaucratic misconduct.
Descriptive statistics was complemented with 24 in-
terviews with civil servants responsible for designing
anti-misconduct measures and for investigating their col-
leagues and recommending sanctions against them. This
study used a convenience sample and respondent-driven
samples, i.e., non-probability sample, but an easily se-
lectable subset of a hard-to-reach population, in this case
of civil servants directly involved in the creation and func-
tioning of the disciplinary system. When accessibility is
an issue andmaterials are sensitive, non-probability sam-
ples are easily acceptable and applicable (Bryman, 2008)
and can provide asymptomatically unbiased estimates
(Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004).
The 24 interviewees comprised individuals who had
decision-making power and participated in the creation
and consolidation of the Office of the Comptroller
General, leaders who helped to design corruption-
monitoring measures, and people with experience in
monitoring the disciplinary system and conducting dis-
ciplinary procedures. Several respondents had direct
experience with more than one initiative. The ones
with expertise in corruption-monitoring were selected
on the basis of the number of sanctions enforced
by each governmental body. Accordingly, participants
were those who were working or had worked di-
rectly for internal affairs units, or were part of disci-
plinary punitive committees (Administrative Disciplinary
Procedures), or who were responsible for monitor-
ing the disciplinary system from the Office of the
Comptroller General in agencies/ministrieswith (i) a high
number of corruption-related sanctions (Social Security,
Justice, Finance, Environment, Labour and Employment,
Integration, and Office of the General Attorney); (ii) a
mediumnumber of corruption-related sanctions (Health,
Defense, Mining and Energy, and Communications);
and (iii) a low number of corruption-related sanctions
(Foreign Affairs, Sports, Cities, Science and Technology,
and Social Development). The Supplementary File gives
general information on the interviews and interviewees,
who cannot be identified, in accordance with the King’s
College London Research Ethics Subcommittee’s authori-
sation to this study (Reference Number HR14/150795).
The interviews, whichwere conducted in Portuguese,
combined a pre-determined set of questions with open
and prompted questions using prompting and probing
(Bryman, 2008; Fielding & Thomas, 2001). The intervie-
wees were first asked to talk about their career path
and how they started working in the disciplinary system.
Then, the perceived costs, constraints and incentives in
creating rules and in investigating their own peers for cor-
ruption and other offences were discussed, followed by
the most common type of defendant and offences, and
themajor issues and qualities of the Brazilian disciplinary
system. Finally, theywere showed and asked to comment
on figures and tables separating corruption-related and
non-corruption related offences. The average duration
of the interviews was 1 hour 10 minutes and the over-
all duration of the recorded material was approximately
28 hours.
The analysis of how the same questions were ad-
dressed allowed me to identify certain traits and top-
ics repeated by the respondents. In this exploratory
study, the analyses of the interviews were initially made
through deductive and inductive coding (Boyatzis, 1998).
Following that, particular themes and the different ap-
proaches to them were analysed, considering the role
and the governmental body of the interviewee in order to
identify patterns and evaluate the participants’ answers.
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4. Research Context: Controlling Bureaucracies in Brazil
In Brazil, it is only since the 1930s—through three
broad administrative reforms aiming to professionalise
the state bureaucracy and to guarantee economy and
efficiency—that control mechanisms focused on inter-
nal disciplinary procedures and sanctions have gained a
more robust and normative form. In addition, since the
1988 Constitution, Brazil has had a web of accountability
(Mainwaring & Welna, 2003; Power & Taylor, 2011) with
internal and external agencieswhose attributes compete
with and complement each other. Despite the legal ap-
paratus, which looks strong on paper, it was neverthe-
less the case that for decades those in power and in pub-
lic positions at all levels were very likely to indulge in
acts of corruption with little fear of sanction, as enforce-
ment mechanisms were ineffective and the punitive sys-
tem was not closely monitored.
A specific anti-corruption agenda within the civil ser-
vice was introduced only in the mid-1990s and early
2000s. Before 1994, for example, Brazil had no for-
mal public ethical guidelines for civil servants, apart
from the criminal code and civil service statute (Fleisher,
2002). In 2001, the federal executive created an in-
ternal affairs department to investigate and punish
civil servants more rapidly: the Office of the Inspector-
General (Corregedoria Geral da União). This agency was
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s personal polit-
ical response to 16 corruption scandals in his govern-
ment in order to avoid several inquiry committees in
congress (Fleisher, 2002). In 2003, under President Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration, the agency started
its second phase, gaining a new name—the Office of the
Comptroller General (Controladoria Geral da União)—
and ‘anti-corruption’ and transparency as formal, writ-
ten attributes.
Lula’s Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores)
came to power waving an anti-corruption banner, al-
though in government it would face various corruption
scandals and inquiry committees in congress. The Office
of the Comptroller General under Lula, however, was
endowed with a stronger structure and a more quali-
fied workforce. It also became an agency directly linked
to the presidency, fulfilling both administrative and ad-
visory roles. The Office of the Comptroller General be-
came the most important federal executive auditing, dis-
cipline enforcer, and anti-corruption agency, gaining the
status of a cabinet ministry, which meant more freedom
to use the public budget, to select and train its own civil
servants, design bills, and enforce its own plans of ac-
tion. However, the head of the Office of the Comptroller
General continues to be appointed by the president and
since 2014 the agency has had a limited budget.
In January 2019, after President Jair Bolsonaro took
office, the Office of the Comptroller General remodelled
part of its internal structure, gained a new secretariat
for fighting corruption, and renamed the Secretariat for
Corruption Prevention to Secretariat for Transparency
and Corruption Prevention (Brazilian Presidency, 2019).
The changes made did not necessarily improve the gov-
ernmental agencies’ disciplinary systems or enforce an
anti-corruption culture across agencies. On the con-
trary, the new structure closed down the Office of the
Comptroller General’s sectoral inspectorates (corregedo-
rias setoriais), responsible for monitoring the flow, qual-
ity, and efficiency of disciplinary procedures in each min-
istry and respective bodies individually. There are now
three coordinators responsible for controlling the en-
tire disciplinary system by ‘topics’ (admissibility of evi-
dence, disciplinary procedures, and promoting the sys-
tem’s integrity).
And yet, not every agency has a formal department
with workers exclusively dedicated to investigating mal-
practice and analysing disciplinary cases. In May 2017,
for example, 231 agencies were under the Office of the
Comptroller General’s supervision but only 22% (n = 51)
of them had their own internal affairs departments (cor-
regedorias seccionais).
Although the Office of the Comptroller General has
become a key rule maker and supervisor of the bureau-
cratic accountability process over time, it has never been
active in carrying out investigative procedures in each
and every agency. Civil servants have been expected
to monitor and recommend administrative penalties
against their peers in their respective governmental bod-
ies. In special cases, depending on the defendant and on
the circumstances, the Office of the Comptroller General
can lead the investigation instead of the agency where
the civil servant allegedly committed the misconduct. In
addition, administrative procedures in Brazil run in par-
allel with court cases against both career and politically-
appointed civil servants. This means that corrupt agents
have to be prosecuted independently by both administra-
tive committees and judicial courts. Administrative and
court procedures are completely independent, but they
abide by the same legal infrastructure and all evidence
collected in one proceeding can be used in the other.
The mechanisms created to investigate and punish
civil servants administratively have an essentially reac-
tive incident-oriented function (Macaulay, 2002). There
are many possible motivations for opening a procedure
within the disciplinary system, but the reason is never
recorded. To report anymisconduct, the alleged offences
can be detailed in writing by anyone, including citizens,
other civil servants or representatives from external ac-
countability agencies. News reported by the media is
also considered. Although anonymous allegations are of-
ficially accepted, interviewees reported that they tend
not to be prioritised.
An Administrative Disciplinary Procedure (Procedi-
mento Administrativo Disciplinar) can only be opened
after collection of evidence indicating that the offence
did indeed take place. In this case, a temporary com-
mittee with three members—civil servants at the same
or higher rank than the defendant, preferably from the
same agency—is called in to analyse whether the federal
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civil servant has committed irregularities in the perfor-
mance of his or her duties, and to suggest punishments.
Witnesses should be called and every opportunity given
to the civil servant to defend himself or herself while re-
ceiving legal counsel. The committee has up to 120 days
to finish the report, but cases can be prolonged.
Penalties vary from a warning to suspension and/or
fines for less severe offences (see Supplementary File).
In the case of serious misconduct, such as corruption,
the penalties are dismissal, demotion, or cancellation of
pension—all three considered ‘capital punishment’ by
the bureaucracy. If they are considered appropriate by
the committee, the final report is sent for approval or re-
jection to the cabinetminister responsible for the agency
where the investigation took place. It is always possible
to appeal to the courts, given that the judiciary has the fi-
nal word on whether to uphold the sanction or reinstate
the civil servant.
5. Empirical Analysis
An administrative penalty is not a new tool for deterring
bureaucratic misconduct. In Brazil, however, it has been
used to an increasing extent, especially against acts of
corruption. Between 2003 and 2014, the number of civil
servants working for the Brazilian federal government in-
creased by 18% (from 485,980 to 572,434). The number
of disciplinary procedures that resulted in civil servants
being punished with dismissal, demotion or cancellation
of pension also increased each year—from 268 in 2003
to 429 in 2014, a 60% increase.
As Figure 1 illustrates, in Brazil the number of sanc-
tions enacted in response to acts of corruption has varied
moderately from year to year, although overall, 68.5%
of the total of 5,005 punishments enforced between
January 2003 and November 2014 were related to cor-
ruption. Figure 1 exclusively highlights the growth and
Figure 1. Distribution of ‘expulsive’ sanctions applied to civil servants, January 2003–November 2014, and reason for pun-
ishment. Source: Author based on theOffice of the Comptroller General (2014). N= 5,005 (penalties enforced from January
2003–November 2014). Notes: The classification ‘act of corruption’ is based on the Office of the Comptroller General’s ty-
pology of corruption.
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uneven distribution of sanctions over time and shows
that corruption-related sanctions increasedmore rapidly
than those enforced for other serious offences. Data col-
lected does not support the assumption that punishment
increased rapidly because the number of punitive pro-
cedures for corruption also increased. In fact, after a
rapid increase between 2008 and 2010, overall figures
show a decrease in the number of procedures being
opened. This is particularly the case for Ordinary Cause
Administrative Disciplinary Procedures, initiated in re-
sponse to more serious offences, including corruption.
The Ministries of Social Security, Justice, Education,
Health, and Finance ranked highest for all penalties
enforced. The number of sanctions imposed within a
governmental body was not proportional to the size
of its workforce. The Ministries of Social Security and
Justice, for example, accounted for over 40% of all dis-
missals, although they comprised only 13% of the fed-
eral workforce combined. The agencies that exhibited a
lower propensity to enforce penalties for cases of cor-
ruption include the Ministries of Health and Education.
These two together accounted for about 56% of the to-
tal workforce, but only 26% of the ‘expulsive’ sanctions
enforced (see overall figures on the size of workforce,
wage costs, and number of sanctions enforced in the
Supplementary File).
Although there were a rapid increase and a greater
number of sanctions imposed for corruption than for
other serious administrative offences overall, Figure 2
illustrates a great variation across ministries in the pro-
portion of penalties endorsed, including those related to
corruption. On the one hand, the Ministry of Education,
which encompasses all federal universities, had a to-
tal of 766 sanctions, 81% of them for other serious of-
fences not related to corruption. On the other hand, the
Ministry of Environment enforced 206 sanctions, 94%
of them related to corruption. The Ministry of Social
Development, in turn, enforced zero sanctions, and the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Tourism one sanction
each in the period under analysis.
Figure 2. Number of sanctions for corruption-related and other serious offences enforced per Ministry, January 2003–
November 2014. Source: Author’s based on the Office of the Comptroller General (2014).
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When analysing where punished acts of miscon-
duct took place most commonly, the Institute for Social
Security ranked first as the governmental body that en-
forced the largest number of sanctions. This institute,
under the administrative structure of the Ministry of
Social Security, enforced 1,282 penalties alone, 87% for
corruption-related acts. The federal universities com-
bined ranked secondwith a total of 593 sanctions, 84%of
them for other serious offences not related to corruption.
The Traffic Police, under the structure of the Ministry
of Justice, ranked third: 417 penalties enforced, 90% re-
lated to acts of corruption.
Interviews complemented the statistical analysis and
were helpful in shedding light on a complex issue: The
degree to which a civil servant is exposed to opportuni-
ties for corruption might vary not only according to the
task to which he or she is assigned but also according to
how well internal and external controls function in cer-
tain agencies. This happens partly because the Office of
the Comptroller General’s role is still limited to setting
overall standards and supervising the bureaucratic ac-
countability process, and because not every agency has
an internal affairs unit with dedicated andmotivated per-
sonnel to analyse filed reports, collect initial evidence
and/or conduct punitive procedures. The Office of the
Comptroller General provides a multilateral capability
to support high priority corruption cases without neces-
sarily promoting the implementation of more efficient,
better coordinated and faster operational measures for
combating acts of misconduct in each and every agency.
In other words, the Office of the Comptroller General
has not managed to create its own anti-corruption en-
forcement culture (‘willingness’ to investigate/sanction)
across other agencies.
From the interviews, three main themes emerged as
a result of the attempt to explain the distribution of sanc-
tions between the various agencies: (i) systemic opportu-
nity vs. internal resources, (ii) embedded self-protective
practices, and (iii) a convenient reliance on the web of
accountability institutions.
5.1. Systemic Opportunity vs. Internal Resources
Most interviewees—18 out of 24—seemed to perceive a
clear difference between systemic opportunities for mis-
conduct and the internal resources available to curb such
behaviour, especially acts of corruption, which is directly
linked to each governmental body, its role, and internal
structure. In short, there is a perception that the level
of effectiveness of inspectorates is more likely to impact
on the number of sanctions enforced than the degree to
which the bureaucrats in the agency in question are ex-
posed to opportunities for misconduct by the nature of
their work.
This proved to be the case in 7 out of the 10
bodies that enforced the greatest number of over-
all punishments (75% of all 5,005 sanctions enforced).
The Institute for Social Security, the Traffic Police, the
Revenue Service, the Federal Police, the National Health
Foundation, the Institute of the Environment and the
Labour Offices have workers with a high level of corrup-
tion opportunity, but also have long-established (from
late 1990s/mid-2000s) and well-structured internal af-
fairs units. These have dedicated personnel who are care-
fully selected and receive incentives to investigate and
recommend sanctions (such as top-up salaries or the op-
tion of being transferred to any other state after a certain
period of time). They are also among the agencies that
recommend more sanctions for corruption (over 67%)
than for other serious offences.
In contrast, the Ministries of Health and Education,
which only created general internal affairs units with per-
manent staff in 2013 and 2017 respectively, enforced
more sanctions against other serious offences than cor-
ruption from 2003 to 2014. Jesus Filho (2016), Deputy
Inspector in the Ministry of Health, touches on the topic
of enforcement willingness when he highlights that be-
fore the creation of a centralised structure within the
Ministry of Health, managers in federal hospitals and in-
stitutes were responsible for opening disciplinary pro-
cedures but perceived the investigations as negative:
“Many managers were averse to these procedures. To
them, they make operational, administrative, and man-
agerial issues explicit. Hence, some files were sent to the
archive or stand still without investigation” (Jesus Filho,
2016, p. 12).
The outlier is theMinistry of Finance,whichmanaged
to create, from scratch, an inspectorate that started with
four civil servants in 2013, and four years later had a team
of 55—some of them receiving top-up salaries—working
on different and very well-organised tasks. Sanctions
for corruption also rapidly increased in the Ministry of
Finance. The head of its disciplinary unit sat the formal
exam to work for the Office of the Comptroller General
and was then re-allocated to occupy a position of trust in
theMinistry of Finance, establishing the fight against cor-
ruption as a priority. Interviewee 23, who works in the
Ministry of Finance’s internal affairs unit, highlights the
importance of being independent at the same time as re-
ceiving political support from the top in order to improve
internal disciplinary control.
Most of the interviewees believed that the absence
of well-structured internal affairs units increases the
likelihood of civil servants being personally responsible
for opening and conducting procedures against their di-
rect or former colleagues, which is likely to increase the
constraints and the costs for them. This happens be-
cause members of disciplinary committees can be civil
servants randomly selected to conduct punitive proce-
dures. In theory, they cannot decline the task, except
in cases of family or personal links, although it is very
common for a civil servant to decline by presentingmed-
ical statements or a note signed by the civil servant’s di-
rect manager.
However, the data suggest that themere existence of
an internal affairs unit and the fact that a governmental
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body has high capacity in terms of general professionali-
sation and resources does not guarantee that there will
be a high number of sanctions. Although meritocratic re-
cruitment, a predictable bureaucratic career ladder, and
relatively high salariesmay increase competence and cor-
porate coherence, in the case of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs it did not result in a high number of disciplinary
procedures. In fact, between 2003 and 2014, only one
civil servant—not a career diplomat but a lower-ranking
administrative official—was dismissed. Among integrity
enforcers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is known as a
governmental body where self-protective behaviour pre-
vails when it comes to internal accountability and con-
trols. For Brazilian diplomats, the perceived costs of max-
imising accountability are extremely high, especially be-
cause personal connections and maintaining cordial re-
lations with superiors are very important for promotion
and career advancement.
Interviewee 7, who helped to design disciplinary
mechanisms and has expertise in conducting administra-
tive procedures, explicitly linked the low level of penal-
ties to a self-protection strategy in certain agencies. He
implied that administrative discretion is also used to de-
cide who is investigated and who is not, based on crite-
ria that lie beyond legal requirements and internal struc-
tures. He also used the term “sausage factory” to de-
scribe how an administrative disciplinary procedure is
carried out, because “you put whatever you want inside
it”—meaning that there is great scope to exercise discre-
tion and that the quality of the work carried out by inves-
tigative committee members varies greatly.
5.2. Embedded Self-Protective Practices
The majority of the interviewees were quite open in
stating that they find the task of conducting investiga-
tions embarrassing, and stressed that professional, and
physical, proximity to the defendant makes it especially
difficult—by proximity they meant not only having a
close relationship but also sharing the workplace or hav-
ing already worked together. For example, several cited
the uncomfortable scenario of encountering the target
of an investigation every day, walking down the corridor
or in the elevator. Interviewees also perceived the pur-
suit of absolute integrity as very costly in both monetary
and non-monetary terms, although they recognised it as
their duty to hold peers accountable.
Interviewee 17, for example, stressed that, although
heworks for the Traffic Police, he has been invited to con-
duct “over 400 disciplinary procedures in different agen-
cies” because he is among the few civil servants who ac-
tually “like and know how” to investigate bureaucrats for
corruption. In the Office of the Comptroller General, as
one would expect from an anti-corruption agency, the
embarrassment of investigating or punishing colleagues
is felt to be less intense once a correctional unit has
been established, with civil servants selected specifically
to carry out disciplinary actions.
Corruption-related procedures are considered to
generate more constraints and are perceived as costlier
even for those working in disciplinary units. Inter-
viewee 21, permanently allocated to the inspectorate of
a governmental body, admitted he does not like being in-
volved in the investigation of corruption cases “because
[he does] not have the right tools or knowledge” to carry
them out. He also stated that most of the time he sees
himself more as a social worker, trying to help people
save their jobs when the suspicions against them are not
based on concrete evidence, or when they cause psycho-
logical or other health issues.
Only two interviewees directly used the word cor-
porativismo, meaning self-protective behaviour, to ex-
plain the embarrassment experienced by civil servants
targeting their peers. But many of them highlighted that
the greater the proximity of the investigator to the in-
dividual under investigation, the greater the discomfort.
Interviewee 1, a career civil servant at the Office of
the Comptroller General, recognised that those creating
the norms and internal mechanisms aimed at improv-
ing accountability have diagnosed the problem of self-
protective behaviour. To try to circumvent the embar-
rassment involving those workers who often share loy-
alty, a stock database of the presidents of administrative
investigative procedures and the othermemberswas cre-
ated to be shared among agencies and avoid the ‘proxim-
ity factor’. He admits the database of civil servantswilling
to be part of the Administrative Disciplinary Procedures’
committee has not been working properly.
There was also a consensus—23 out 24 inter-
viewees—that imposing discipline through investigation
and punishment is not a task for everyone. There are cer-
tain personality types who are liable to jeopardise the
procedure, whether by seeking to protect the accused
or, at the other extreme, by taking an excessively severe
approach. However, there was no consensus about what
the right personality for investigating peers would be.
Most interviewees agreed that it is not necessary to have
a legal background, and that the suitable person should
not have ‘blood in their eyes’ or be over-emotional. The
incentives the interviewees considered effective were fi-
nancial rewards and the offer of a transfer to another
agency after the investigation has been concluded.
5.3. A Convenient Reliance on the Web of Accountability
Institutions
The majority of the interviewees referred to ‘easier’
and/or ‘faster’ procedures, mainly those involving the
efficient collection of evidence by other external actors
within the web of accountability such as the Federal
Police and the Prosecution Service. Some of them ad-
mitted that these easier procedures are prioritised and
are more likely to be concluded quickly. On the other
hand, few interviewees openly said that easy targets—
including individuals with little power—are prioritised.
Interviewee 16 openly admitted that rational choices are
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made in the real world when investigating and punishing
civil servants, and used cost-benefit vocabulary such as
‘maximise the outcome’:
Ideally, from the legal perspective, no irregularity
could take place without being investigated. [But] in
the real world we do have scarce resources, which
makes it necessary to prioritise. And prioritisation
will require a strategy of action. It is evident that if
we have fewer resources the idea is to maximise the
outcome. Actually, if we have a situation in which
the collection of evidence is strong, as in the Federal
Police operations, or in which there are more ro-
bust elements or the amount of money [involved] is
higher…the outcome of one single case can be the
same as hundreds of others. This needs to be our strat-
egy. The [key] elements…investigation by the police,
higher position of trust, large amounts of money, the
involvement of more than one agency, are a conse-
quence of the need to prioritise….We do not have the
structure to investigate everything. (Interviewee 16,
who monitors the disciplinary system from the Office
of the Comptroller General)
The high level of dependence on the web of account-
ability institutions also impacts on the overall figures for
sanctions. Interviewee 13, for example, clarified how the
practice of internal disciplinary control is connected to,
and in a way dependent upon, the multi-organisational
accountability system. As an example, she said that most
of the Institute of the Environment’s disciplinary pro-
cedures are opened after operations by the Federal
Police. For her, “it makes things much easier. The [dis-
ciplinary] procedure is much faster, the search for evi-
dencewill not be such a complex task for the committee.”
According to her, when there is nothing solid to open an
administrative investigation, integrity enforcers go first
to the police.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
This exploratory study was an attempt to uncover the
dynamics of the official response to bureaucratic corrup-
tion, combining descriptive statistics on the distribution
of administrative penalties and semi-structured inter-
views that captured the perception of integrity enforcers.
The executive branch in Brazil and its government work-
ers were used as a case study. Despite the rapid growth
in penalties, in particular those for corruption, an en-
during resistance to making the fight against corruption
a top priority in their respective bodies was observed
among most integrity enforcers—the exception, as ex-
pected, is the Office of the Comptroller General, the anti-
corruption agency within the Brazilian federal executive.
The findings show great cross-agency diversity in
corruption-control mechanisms. The data indicate that
penalties for corruption are highly concentrated in a few
agencies—sanctions recommended by the Institute for
Social Security, the Traffic Police and the Ministry of
Finance together account for 51% of the 3,429 penal-
ties for corruption enforced in the period under analysis.
Overall, participants considered corruption-related pro-
cedures more complex to investigate and, accordingly,
they are perceived by those responsible for holding their
peers accountable as costlier than those related to other
administrative offences. The findings also suggest that
agencies with well-established internal affairs units are
more likely to enforce sanctions against corruption. This
is because they often have more specialised and moti-
vated staff available to select and evaluate the material
evidence before opening procedures, and to form part of
the disciplinary committees that conduct the investiga-
tions. Having a skilled integrity enforcer is as important
as having a civil servant who is willing and not embar-
rassed to enforce the law against his or her own peers.
This particular set of findings complements
Gingerich’s (2013) insights into the Brazilian bureaucracy.
He identified a large variance in the perception of cor-
ruption control mechanisms in the Brazilian bureaucracy
when measuring institutional politicisation and parti-
san exploitation. While Gingerich associates dysfunc-
tional agencies with political pressures, this study iden-
tifies a link between the variance in sanctions enforced
and low incentives, perceived constraints and costs re-
lated to the disciplinary work, particularly in the case
of corruption-related procedures. Although a few inter-
viewees were quick to mention political pressures, they
were not portrayed as being more significant constraints
than individual reluctance, self-seeking behaviour or in-
stitutional incapacity.
Because of factors other than the actual wrongdo-
ing that they are tasked with investigating, these in-
tegrity enforcers use discretion in exercising their offi-
cial authority, so as to reduce difficulty and inconve-
nience from their own perspective. If, for whatever rea-
son, integrity enforcers perceive formal laws, rules, and
procedures as detrimental and/or costly for them per-
sonally, they might circumvent them. In addition, the
relationship between anti-corruption agencies like the
Office of the Comptroller General and the web of en-
forcers within ministries is a key issue that has been ne-
glected so far by the literature on anti-corruption agen-
cies. This article found evidence that the disciplinary re-
forms that have taken place in Brazil, especially with
the creation of the Office of the Comptroller General,
have not established a fully operational horizontal ac-
countability system within the executive. As observed in
the reforms that have brought about the transition from
patronage to merit-based civil service systems (Geddes,
1994; Grindle, 2012), new disciplinary rules are resisted
and often subverted.
The chances are high that integrity enforcers will be
reluctant and/or selective when it comes to starting an
internal investigation, particularly in corruption-related
cases. The findings also suggest that where accountabil-
ity is openly pursued to the fullest extent, it is more
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likely to lead to a higher number of sanctions. However,
it is more likely that a situation of ‘convenient account-
ability’ exists, with agencies heavily conditioned by ex-
ternal actors of horizontal accountability, and/or fewer
penalties being enforced. With convenient accountabil-
ity, there are more perceived constraints, fewer incen-
tives and, therefore, more room for collusion between
agents, as observed in the Brazilian case.
The findings presented here show that anti-
corruption agencies should be more active and more
present within each disciplinary unit, in order to improve
motivation and put the anti-corruption narrative into
practice. In addition, public policies should focus on cre-
ating incentives for civil servants to monitor their peers.
Accountability is more likely to be more objective and
powerful with an internal affairs department in each
governmental body and higher professional standards
for the internal affairs units with specific requirements
for the job.
The Brazilian case indicates that the likelihood of mis-
conduct being investigated and punished, particularly in
cases of corruption, can be increased by the existence
of a long-term and well-structured internal affairs unit
in governmental bodies, a perception of fewer impedi-
ments on the part of the integrity enforcers enforcing
the sanctions, and the actions of external actors of the
accountability system. Due to the limited data available,
further research is needed to provide information on the
capacity to enforce sanctions, on the ministries’ expo-
sure to the risk of corruption, and on external procedures
that motivate the opening of an internal investigation or
are used to punish both criminally and administratively
civil servants. Further research should explore the char-
acteristics of those who have been punished, their polit-
ical affiliation, their proximity to the integrity enforcers,
and the time elapsed between the start and the conclu-
sion of the procedures.
More robust models of convenient accountability
and of the willingness to enforce internal control should
also be tested by future research. From what we have
learned, self-policing is possible and some governmen-
tal bodies are performing better than others in over-
seeing and punishing bureaucratic misconduct. But to
be more effective, the control of bureaucratic corrup-
tion should become less reactive to external demands.
In this way, accountability may become more inconve-
nient—for those who break the law as well as for in-
tegrity enforcers—and therefore less selective, andmore
powerful and productive.
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